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Responding to Students' Pleas for Relief:
The Need for a Consistent Approach to Peer

Sexual Harassment Claims
I.

INTRODUCTION

One day a senior high school student stopped sophomore Katy Lyle in the
Do you know what they're
hall and said, "You're such a nice girl ....
Graffiti,
scratched in with a2
bathroom?"
writing about you in the boys
of the bathroom.
walls
two
covered
ink,
knife or written in permanent
Dubbed the "Katy stall" by the guys, obscenities such as "Katie Lyle is a
slut," "Katie Lyle sucked my d-- after she sucked my dog's d--," or "Katie
Lyle gives good head" were written on the walls of the boys' bathroom at
the Duluth Central High School.3 Katy never found out who wrote the
obscenities or why they decided to pick on her.4 Then the comments
followed, such as "oh, Katy, do me" as the morning hello or "are you as
good as everyone says?" for the hour bus ride home.5 When Katy sought
help from the principal, his response was "boys will be boys [and] graffiti
is a fact of life.",6 The7 principal promised to remove the graffiti but did not
for nearly two years.
In the beginning of the 1992 school year, two sisters feared the daily bus
ride to school. 8 A boy identified by his initials as "G.S." regularly swatted
the girls' bottoms as they walked down the aisle to their seats while
exclaiming such comments as "when are you going to let me f--- you?" or
' 9 At one point, G.S. grabbed one of
"what size panties are you wearing ?"
the girl's genital area and then her breasts.10 Afterwards, another student,
whose initials were "L.H.," also imitated the conduct of G.S. and reached
1. See Katy Lyle, Sexual Harassmentin the Boy's Room: One Teen's True Story,

Choices, Jan. 1993, reprintedinNAN STEIN and LISA SJOsTRUm, FLIRTING OR HURTING, at
95 (1994).
2. Id.
3. See Adrian Nicole LeBlanc, Harassmentin the Halls, Seventeen, Sept. 1993,
reprintedin NAN STEIN and LISA SJOSTRUM, FLIRTING OR HURTING, at 89 (1994).

4.
5.
6.
7.

Lyle, supra note 1.
LeBlanc, supra note 3.
Lyle, supra note 1.
Id.

8. See Bill Hewitt, Bitter Lessons, People Weekly, Oct. 28, 1996, at 54.

9. SeeRowinskyv. Bryan Independent Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1008 (5th Cir.) cert.

denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996).
10. Id.
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up the other sister's skirt, made a crude remark, and then grabbed her
genital area." Mrs. Rowinsky, the mother of the girls, complained to the
superintendent about the school's failure to take sufficient action against
G.S. and L.H. 12 The superintendent informed Mrs. Rowinsky13that she did
not deem what had happened to the two sisters to be assaults.
Such actual reports describe a type of conduct called peer or student-tostudent sexual harassment. Student-to-student sexual harassment is a
relatively new term for a behavior that has constantly been plaguing our
children's environment throughout their elementary and high school
education. Leading reseacher Nan Stein defines peer sexual harassment as
".... unwanted and unwelcome sexual behavior which interferes with your
right to get an education or to partcipate in school activities. It may result
from words or conduct that offend, stigmatize or demean a student on the
14
basis of sex .... Harassment can be a one-time or multiple occurence."
In a 1993 survey15 researchers found an alarming 81% of students
reported some experience of sexual harassment and that nearly four in five
of those students had been the target of peer sexual harassment. 16 The
most common forms of reported sexual harassment were comments, jokes,
gestures, or looks. 17 At the other extreme, 11% of students reported being
forced to do something sexual other than kissing.18 In between these two
points were various other sexual harassment experiences, both physical and
non-physical. 19 Students also reported that sexual harassment overwhelmingly occurs in the hallways and classrooms, places that are generally
viewed as open and safe.20
Since peer sexual harassment has been discovered as a problem affecting
the educational environment of our children, more lawsuits are being filed
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 1009.
Id.
Id.
Nan Stein, Stop Sexual Harassmentin Schools, USA TODAY, May 18, 1993,

reprintedin NAN STEIN and LISA SJOsTRtJm, FLIRTING OR HuRTING, at 102 (1994).
15. AMERICAN ASS'N OF UNIV. WOMEN FOUND., HosnIE HALLWAYS: THE AAUW
SURVEY ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN AMERICA'S ScHOOLs, June 1993. The AAUW
commissioned Louis Harris and Associates who conducted a total of 1,632 field survey that
were completed by public school students in grades 8 through 11, from 79 schools across the
country. Id. at 5.

16. Id. at 7. In comparing sexual harassment of girls and boys: "Among the 81% who
report being harassed, the gender gap is surprisingly narrow; 85% of girls and 76% of boys
surveyed say they have experienced unwanted and unwelcome sexual behavior that interferes
with their lives." Id.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 13.
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by students seeking to hold school districts and school officials liable for
2 1 Although the introducongoing sexual harassment by their classmates.
tion stories of Katy Lyle and the two sisters are similar, the legal outcome
22
of their peer sexual harassment claims illustrates the "split" among the
courts in acknowledging the issue. On the one hand, Katy Lyle's suit
23
it went to court.
against the school district was settled for $15,000 before
On the other, the Fifth Circuit Appellate Court entered a summary judgment
24
against the two sisters after the court narrowly interpreted Title DC, the
which prohibits discrimination based on sex in educational
federal statute
25
programs.
Dealing with peer sexual harassment is an issue that is considerably difficult for schools to handle, let alone the courts. While a number of school
districts develop sexual harassment policies, some school districts continue
to treat harassment as just another form of bullying or teasing among classmates. For those students who have been repeatedly sexually harassed and
whose cries to stop the harassment are not heard by their teachers, school
officials, or peers, the courts are the last resort for them to seek a remedy.
as Section 198326
Armed with federal anti-discrimination statutes, such
and Title DC, 27 students who choose to enter the legal arena are finding
that the courts are split acrosa the country in their interpretation and application of these federal statutes to peer sexual harassment claims.
The goal of this article is to illustrate the need for courts to develop a
uniform approach in remedying claims of student-to-student sexual
harassment occuring in the primary and secondary school environment. This
comment describes the courts' inconsistent application of Section 1983 and
21. See Tamara Henry, More Kids Sue School Over Peer Sex Harassment,USA
TODAY, Oct. 1, 1996, § D at I(reporting I1 sexual harassment complaints filed with the U.S.
Department of Education in 1991 by elementary and high school students and a jump to 79
complaints filed by school children in 1995.)
22. The "split" among the courts was originally recognized in West Legal News. See
CourtsSplit on School District'sLiabilityforStudent-to-StudentSexual Harassment,West's
Legal News, Aug. 15, 1996, availablein 1996 WL 456792.
23. LeBlanc, supra note 3 at 92. Even though Katy Lyle was fortunate enough to

receive a settlement for the harassment she endured, a new problem emerged where some

members of the community became outraged when their tax dollars were spent through the
school district's settlement. Id. Recently, a 14-year-old girl won a $500,000 award from a
jury that found school officials disregarded her complaints of peer sexual harassment. See
Teen Girl Wins $500,000 Award OverHarassmentin 6th Grade,CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Oct. 3,
1996 at 13. Undoubtedly, where 93.4% of the award is to be paid by the school district,

such an award will cause a much larger outrage among taxpayers in that community than in
Katy Lyle's case.
24. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988).
25. See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1016.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
27. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988).
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Title IX to claims of students who have been sexually harassed by their
classmates. Part I introduces the problem of peer sexual harassment. Part
II discusses Section 1983 claims and contends that courts should maintain
Section 1983 as an avenue of relief by which a student may sue the school
officials instead of just the school district, or as a way to force the schools
to recognize same gender sexual harassment. Part I provides a background
to the recent emergence of Title IX for student-to-student sexual harassment
claims. Part IV discusses the fluctuation among courts in applying Title IX
to peer sexual harassment claims. Additionally, in part IV this comment
encourages the courts to expand the liability of school districts to include
school officials. This comment recommends also that a uniform standard
of liability be applied by all the courts and that the "deliberate indifference"
test is the most appropriate standard. Further, the courts are urged to follow
the Eleventh Circuit's proposed standard for determining when sexual
harassment is so severe as to require a remedy by the courts. Part V
concludes that the courts must be uniform in their approach to peer sexual
harassment claims so that the courts can provide relief when the schools
disregard students' pleas to stop peer sexual harassment.
II.

THE USE OF SECTION

1983 IN PEER SEXUAL HARASSMENT CLAIMS

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage . . . subjects, or cause to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States or other perspn
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress .... 28
The purpose of federal Section 1983 is to protect persons from a
deprivation of their constitutional rights by others who are acting under any
law. 29

Pagano v. Massapequa Public Schools30 was the first case to

successfully bring a Section 1983 cause of action against school officials
when they failed to prevent continuing abuse between students. 31 The
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
29. Id.

30. Pagano v. Massapequa Pub. Sch., 714 F. Supp. 641 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).

31. Id. at 644. The student-victim alleged that during his fifth and sixth grade year,
he was physically and verbally abused by other students. School officials were reportedly
aware of the attacks and had expressly said they would take steps to prevent the abuse, but
the officials failed to prevent the continuing attacks. Id. at 642. Although the abuse in
Pagano was not specifically referred to as "sexual harassment," this comment notes a similar
comparison between physical and verbal abuse between students and peer sexual harassment
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claim against the school officials was successful because Section 1983
allows an individual to avoid state law immunity for public institutions such

as school districts and to bring a suit against school officials in their
individual capacity. 32 This success, however, was not repeated in later
peer sexual harassment cases. 33 The handful of cases after Pagano which
that
alleged a Section 1983 claim usually failed for either of two reasons:
34 or that
abuse
sexual
from
students
protect
to
officials
no duty exists for
when the alleged injurious
a valid Section 1983 claim cannot be upheld
35
officials.
school
conduct is by students, not
However, two recent cases have maintained unique causes of action for
36 In light of these two
Section 1983 peer sexual harrassment claims.
cases, this comment urges the courts to support the use of Section 1983 for
peer sexual harassment claims where it provides a claim against school
officials in addition to school districts, and where it allows a victim to bring
a claim for same gender peer sexual harassment.
A. GENERAL BASIS FOR FAILURE OF SECTION 1983 CAUSES OF ACTION

To state a valid Section 1983 claim the student must show that a school
district or official deprived the student of his or her constitutional or federal
37
rights while acting under color of state law. The Supreme Court has
implicitly established a protected Section 1983 federal right for students to
be free from teacher sexual abuse.38 However, in the context of studentto-student sexual harassment, the alleged constitutional deprivation occurs
where both types of conduct are unwelcomed by the victim.
32. For a discussion of the Section 1983 claim for school official's liability, see
William D. Valante, Comment, School Districtand Official Liabilityfor Teacher Sexual
Abuse of Students Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, 57 ED. LAW REP. 645, 646-649 (1990).
33. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Ed., 862 F. Supp. 363 (M.D. Ga. 1994), claim
reinstated, 74 F.3d 1186, 1187 (1lth. Cir),vacated 91 F.3d 1418 (1996) (finding that
plaintiffs § 1983 claim is without merit and dismissing the argument without further discussion), originalclaim dismissed,1997 WL 475207 (1997); Bosley v. Kearney R-I Sch. Dist.,
904 F. Supp. 1006, 1019 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (holding that plaintiffs claims under Section 1983
fail as a matter of law).
34. See, e.g., Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 732 (8th Cir. 1993),
aff'g 794 F. Supp. 1405 (E.D. Ark 1992).
35. See Elliott v. New Miami Bd. of Ed., 799 F. Supp. 818 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
36. See Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996); Oona R. -S. by Kate S. v.
Santa Rosa City Schs., 890 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
37. See, e.g., Elliot, 799 F. Supp. at 820.
38. The Supreme Court found that 14th amendment liberty interests are implicated
when school authorities, acting under color of state law, deliberately punish a child for
misconduct by inflicting physical pain in Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 674 (1977).
The Supreme Court's recognition of a student's constitutional right to be free from physical
abuse by a teacher would include the right to be free from teacher sexual abuse. See Valante,
supra note 32 at 646 n.7.
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when a school district or official fails to prevent sexual harassment inflicted
by other students. Since the conduct of the harassing student deprives the
other student's constituitonal rights, Section 1983 claims are difficult to
bring against the school district or official where they are not the source of
the actual deprivation. 39 The courts have considered and for the most part
rejected two theories for imposing Section 1983 liability for an official's
failure to protect a student from the harassing conduct of a third party: (1)
school officials have a constitutional duty to protect students from peer
harassment; (2) school officials act with such deliberate or reckless
indifference to known or reasonably discoverable harm occurring to students
as to project a policy, practice, or custom that encouraged the abuse of a
40
student.
Under the first argument, the courts have repeatedly considered whether
school districts have a constitutional duty to protect students from peer
sexual harassment arising out of mandatory school attendance laws. 41 So
far, Paganois the only case where a court found that school officials owed
a duty to protect students from abusive conduct by other students because
of truancy laws. 42 Otherwise, students have unsuccessfully argued that
compulsory school attendance laws restrain a student's liberty to the extent
that the student should be owed a duty of care by the state, just as the state
is under a duty to protect prisoners from violence by other prison inmates.43 For example, in Dorothy J. v. Little Rock School District44 the
court acknowledged that a constitutional duty of care arises only when the
State exercises an affirmative power to restrain someone to the extent that
45
he or she is unable to care or provide for their basic human needs.
Therefore, because the State-mandated school attendance law does not
prohibit a child's parents from providing for the child's basic needs, the
court held that the attendance law does not entail so restrictive a custodial

39. The original identification of the difficulty in showing a failure to act by a school

offical which infringes on a protected § 1983 right is by Valente, supra note 32 at 648.
40. See, e.g., Elliot, 799 F. Supp. at 820.

41. See, e.g., Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 732 (8th Cir. 1993);

Elliot, 799 F. Supp. at 821-822; Pagano, 714 F. Supp. at 643.
42. See Pagano, 714 F. Supp at 643.

43. See, e.g., Elliot, 799 F. Supp. at 821. The court reasoned that students, like the
institutionalized, can complain to officials, but, unlike the institutionalized, students may also
turn on a daily basis to their guardians for help. Mandatory school attendance laws do not
cut off all help from outside sources for school children. Id. at 821.
44. 7 F.3d 729 (8th Cir. 1993).
45. Id. at 732. (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dpt. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S.
189 (1989)).
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as to impose upon the State the same duty it owes to prison
relationship
46
inmates.
As to the second theory for Section 1983 liability for official inaction, a
school official can be liable if the inaction was part of a policy, custom or
47
This theory works well only in
practice by the school district.
teacher-student harassment cases where courts have imposed Section 1983
of ignoring the
liability when the State has a policy, custom, or practice
48 In peer harassment
violative acts by a state agent, such as a teacher.
liability
cases, however, the courts have refused to impose Section 1983
been
not
has
under this second theory because the underlying harassment4 9
Since the
committed by a state agent but by a fellow classmate.
and
actors
private
are
suits
perpetrating students in peer sexual harassment
that
found
have
courts
are not in any way connected with the State, the
be no imposition of Section 1983 liability under this second
there can
50
theory.
B. POTENTIAL USE OF SECTION 1983 CLAIMS FOR PEER SEXUAL
HARASSMENT

Even though the majority of courts have considered and rejected a cause
of action for student-to-student sexual harassment under Section 1983, two
on
cases have emerged in the area which might lead to a future reliance
City
Rosa
Santa
v.
S.
Section 1983. The first case, Oona R.-S. by Kate
Schools, 5 1 is the leading case to address the question of whether a52cause
of action exists under Section 1983 for a violation of Title IX, the
federal statute which prohibits discrimination based on sex in educational
peer
programs, when a teacher or school official allegedly pennitted the
sexual harassment. 53 The importance of the Oona v. Santa Rosa decision
is that using Section 1983 as an enforcement mechanism of Title IX may
provide an avenue of relief for students that wish to sue the school officials
who intentionally discriminated against the student, rather than choosing to
sue a faceless school district. The second case to bring an exceptional

1006,
46. 7 F.3d at 732. AccordBosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. District, 904 F. Supp.
school
1016-1019 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (provides a detailed analysis as to why compulsory

attendance laws do not create a constitutional duty of care on the school district to protect
students from sexual harrassment by fellow students).
47. See Elliot, 799 F. Supp at 823.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. 890 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
52. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988).
53. Id. at 1459.
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Section 1983 claim is Nabozny v. Podlesny54 where the court acknowledged a claim for same-gender peer sexual harassment. 55 An overview of
these two cases is necessary to demonstrate the significance of the Section
1983 allegations.
In Oona v. Santa Rosa, the sixth-grade plaintiff charged the school
district and school officials with permitting a sexually hostile environment
because of their failure to prevent Oona's male peers from harassing her and
other girls in her class. 5° For example, after Oona reported one of the
boy's harassing conduct in the class log book, the boy struck Oona in the
face, and told her to "get used to it."' Oona's mother then complained
about the harassing conduct to the principal, and the principal's response
was that Oona could transfer to any other elementary school in the
district. 58 After such a response, Oona's mother formally filed a complaint against the school officials with the Office for Civil Rights. 59
Surprisingly, the complaints from Oona and her parents irritated Oona's
teacher so much that the teacher practically retaliated against Oona. 60 In
the end Oona was withdrawn from school by her mother.61
In regards to Oona's complaint, the Northern District Court of California
held that a Section 1983 action may properly be based on alleged violations
of Title IX.62 The court based its holding on two reasons. First, Title IX
creates an enforceable right to not be discriminated against on the basis of
sex in educational programs. 63 Second, the remedial scheme under Title

54. 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996).
55. Id.

56. Oona v. Santa Rosa, 890 F. Supp. at 1456.
57. Id. at 1457.
58. Id.
59. Id.

60. Id. at 1458. Oona's teacher refused to let her work with the other students on a
newsletter after school where no teacher would be present, telling Oona that "your mom
wouldn't like you to be here unsupervised." The teacher also canceled a play for an "Open

House" in which Oona was to perform, however, none of the other events were canceled.
Along with other acts of retaliation, the teacher reprimanded Oona for "writing up" the boy
who slapped her rather than reporting the incident immediately. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1462.

63. Id. at 1460. The court found an enforceable right under Title IX for two reasons.
First, the language of Title IX unequivocally states that "no person" may be discriminated
against on the basis of gender in certain educational programs. Second, the court found
nothing in the language of Title IX which demonstrates Congress' intent to preclude
enforcement of a particular right under Section 1983. Id.

19971

PEER SEXUAL HARASSMENT

IX is not sufficiently comprehensive to preclude students from enforcing
that right by way of Section 1983. 64
The court then questioned whether the conduct alleged by Oona
65
First, the
amounted to a deprivation of a right secured by Title IX.
in this
IX
Title
by
court inquired into the nature of the right created
6
context. 0 After reviewing relevant precedent and the language of the
statute itself, the court held that Title IX secures for individuals a firm right
not to be discriminated against on the basis of gender in all aspects of
federally-funded educational programs. 67 Since Oona secured a right by
Title DC, the court then questioned what type of conduct by a defendant

68
In answer, the court found that
amounts to a deprivation of that right.
the right created by Title IX may be violated when students are subjected
to sexual harassment by their peers and school officials discriminate against
the student-victims by failing to appropriately respond to such harassment.69 Under this standard, Oona was able to state a sufficient Section
1983 claim against school officials where her principal refused to take
sufficient action to counter persistent harassment by Oona's peers and where
more than one occasion because Oona
her teacher retaliated against her on
70
harassment.
the
complained about
Although one district court has held to the contrary of the Oona v. Santa
Rosa decision, 7 1 since then, two different appellate courts have agreed that

64. Id. at 1461. The court predicted that the Supreme Court would not consider the
enforcement structure of Title IX to preclude enforcement by Section 1983. The prediction

was supported by the Supreme Court reasoning in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools, 503 U.S. 60, 71, 112 S.Ct. 1028, 1036 (1992) that Congress did not intend to limit

the remedies available in a suit brought under Title IX. Id.
65. Oona v. Santa Rosa, 890 F. Supp. at 1462.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1466.
69. Id. at 1469.
70. Id. The court rejected the defendant's qualified immunity defense where it found
that a "reasonable school official would have known in 1992 or 1993 that the actions alleged
by plaintiffs here ... would unquestionably violate Oona's federal statutory and constitutional
rights." Id. at 1472.
71. Mennone v. Gordon, 889 F. Supp. 53, 59 (D. Conn. 1995) (one month after the
Oona v. SantaRosa court's decision, the District Court of Connecticut held that Title IX has
a sufficiently comprehensive enforcement scheme to demonstrate that Congress intended to
foreclose enforcement through Section 1983. In determining the relationship between Title
IX and § 1983, the Mennone court reasoned that a student can already seek equitable and
compensatory remedies for violations of Title IX because of the holding in Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Public Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992), in addition to attorney's fees under 42

U.S.C. § 1988).

NORYHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

Section 1983 can be an enforcement mechanism of Title IX.72 Oona v.
Santa Rosa is a unique case because it allowed a student to bring a claim
through Section 1983 against the individual school officials who repeatedly
refused to respond to the complaints of peer sexual harassment. If the
courts continue to find that a Section 1983 Civil Right claim is not barred
by Title IX, then future plaintiffs may be able to sue principals or teachers,
rather than just the school district. As will be discussed later in this
comment, the majority of courts allow a Title IX claim only against school
districts. A plaintiff-student may find it more appealing to see the redress
for his or her injury come from the school officials individually rather than
the school district which is supported by the taxpayers of the community.
Enforcing a Title IX violation through a Section 1983 claim allows
student-plaintiffs an optional avenue of suing the school officials for their
injuries.
The other noticeable case brought pursuant to Section 1983 is Nabozny
v. Podlesny7 3 where the sexually harassing conduct came from students of
the same gender as the victim. 74 Nabozny, an openly male gay student,
had to endure considerable harassment from his peers since the seventh
grade. 75 Nabonzy's classmates regularly called him a "faggot," and
subjected him to a variety of physical abuses, such as striking, urinating, and
spitting on him.76 After Nabozny reported to a school administrator the
increasing harassment by two male students, Jason Welty and Roy Grande,
the harassment by the two male students only intensified. In a science
classroom with twenty other students present, Welty grabbed Nabozny and
pushed him to the floor.77 Welty and Grande continued to hold Nabozny
down and performed a mock rape on him while telling him he should enjoy
it.78 Nabozny then ran to principal Podlesny's office where Podlesny's
alleged response was that "boys will be boys" and that if he was "going to
be so openly gay," he should expect such behavior from his classmates. 79

72. Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 722-24 (6th Cir. 1996)
(holding that section 1983 claims are not replaced by the private right of action under Title
IX); Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1233-34 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that the Section
1983 claim is not barred by Title IX).
73. 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996).
74. See Nabozny,92 F.3d at 451-52. Although same-gender harassment is not an issue
considered in the court's opinion, the bulk of the alleged conduct was male-on-male
harassment. Additionally, the harassing conduct could be considered sexual in nature where

the discrimination occured because of the student-victim's gender and sexual orientation.
75. Id. at 451-452.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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Up to his eleventh grade year, Nabozny endured continuing harassment:
one classmate urinated on him, objects were pelted at him while he rode the
school bus, and, on one occasion, he was kicked in the stomach repeatedly
8 0 Each time he was assaulted school
until he suffered internal bleeding.
taken or told Nabozny that he
officials either promised help with no action
81
gay.
is
deserved such treatment because he
After several attempts at suicide, Nabozny left his hometown and sought
82 In his claim Nabozny filed suit'
medical help as well as legal advice.
pursuant to Section 1983 and alleged that he was denied equal protection of
to
the law where the school officials denied him the protection extended
83
The
orientation.
sexual
other students, because of his gender and
Seventh Circuit held that the school officials intentionally discriminated
against Nabonzy based on his gender and sexual orientation, in violation of
Section 1983 and the Equal Protection Clause, where the school otherwise
students, but made an
enforced their anti-harassment policies for other
4
Nabozny.8
for
exception to their normal practice
Astonishingly, Nabozny was able to bring a cause of action for implicitly
alleged male-on-male sexual harassment. Plaintiffs who suffer same8gender
85
sexual harassment, whether in school or in the work setting, have
generally not been allowed by the courts to bring a cause of action. An
cognizability of
extensive disagreement among the courts persists about the 87
Nonetheless,
same-gender harassment as a form of sex discrimination.
implied that
Circuit
Seventh
the
because
the opinion in Nabozny is unique
male-on-male harassment is a form of sexual discrimination when it is
treated differently from male-on-female harassment.

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 452-53.

83. Id. at 453.

84. Id. at 454-55. The school officials did not deny that they aggressively punished
male-on-female battery and harassment. The court reasoned that if Nabozny's evidence is
considered credible the record demonstrates that the school officials treated male and female
sexual harassment victims differently. Id.
85. See Seamons v. Snow, 864 F. Supp. 1111 (D. Utah 1994), aff'd, 84 F.3d 1226,
1232-1233 (10th Cir. 1996). (holding that the male plaintiff, who was taped naked to a towel
rack by other male peers and then shown to his homecoming date, was not sexually harassed
where the same gender harassment was not "sexual" in nature).
86. See, e.g., Schoiber v. Emro Marketing Co., 941 F. Supp. 730, 732 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
(holding that Title VII does not allow plaintiffs to sue a member of the same gender for
sexual harassment in the workplace setting).
87. See id. The Northern District Court of Illinois noted the debate over same-gender
sexual harassment actionability was escalating and was ripe for circuit precedent. The court's
opinion provides an extensive analysis about the murky area of law relating to same-gender
sexual harrasment claims in the work setting. Id.
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The result of this opinion is that schools must now recognize that samegender harassment can be a form of sex discrimination. If a school does not
appropriately respond to same gender harassment, then the school or school
officials will be liable if the school enforces only male-on-female antiharassment policies. In the future, a student suffering from male-on-male
sexual harassment, such as being taped naked to a towel rack, 88 could find
relief through a Section 1983 Equal Protection violation if the school
provides no assistance for the student's grievance when the school normally
assists male-on-female sexual harassment.
Section 1983 should be recognized as a vehicle by which to bring a peer
sexual harassment claim because it provides at least two additional
opportunities for relief. First, the Section 1983 claim gives student-victims
the ability to sue school officials in their individual capacities for violations
of Title IX, rather than suing only the school district. Second, it provides
the only window of opportunity for a victim to combat same-gender sexual
harassment which is usually not recognized by the courts as a type of sex
discrimination. Although peer sexual harassment claims are now frequently
litigated by way of Title IX of the educational amendments, the Section
1983 claim should remain as an additional avenue of relief for victims of
peer sexual harassment.
1H.

ORIGINS FOR A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR STUDENT TO STUDENT

SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE IX

No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education proram or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance ..
Title IX suits for peer sexual harassment is a new area of litigation-the
first case to successfully argue that a cause of action exists for peer sexual
harassment was brought in August of 1993.90 Although the Section 1983
claim may or may not have adequately served student-victims in the past,
recent legal developments have made Title DC an attractive avenue for
relief 9' A brief history will illustrate how Title IX has emerged as the
governing statute for peer sexual harassment claims.
88. E.g., Seamons, 864 F. Supp at I 11.

89. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).

90. Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993), reconsidered, 949 F. Supp. 1415 (N.D. Cal 1996).
91. See Carrie N. Baker, Comment, Proposed Title IX Guidelines on Sex-Based

Harassmentof Students, 43 EMoRY L.J. 271, 318 (1994).
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Title IX was passed in 1972 to abolish sexual discrimination in federally
funded educational programs and activities. The purpose of enacting Title
IX, according to the bill sponsor, Senator Bayh, was to provide women an
equal chance to attain an education. 9 2 Discrimination based on race or
national origin was already proscribed in federally funded activities through
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 9' but Title VI did not contain
sexual discrimination type prohibitions. 94 At the same time, employer
95
discrimination based on sex was eradicated under Title VII provisions.
Senator Bayh consequently identified the lack of a statutory remedy for
sexual discrimination in federally funded educational activities and closed
between Title VI and Title VII through the enactment of Title
the loophole
IX.96 Since then, Title IX has emerged as the primary vehicle in which
to bring a sexual harassment suit in the educational setting.
The language of Title IX on its face, however, does not specifically
include a statutory remedy for sexual harassment. Neither did Title VII, but
the resulting case law and regulations for Title VII provided that sexual
97
By
harassment in the workplace is a type of sex discrimination.
VII:
Title
by
definition, there are two types of sexual harassment prohibited
98
quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment. Quid pro quo
harassment is the grant or denial of certain benefits conditioned upon the
receipt of sexual favors. 99 Hostile environment harassment occurs when
the nature of the employee's workplace is filled with sexually discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult. 10 Peer sexual harassment commonly

92. S. Res. 874, 92d Cong., 118 CONG. REc. 5803 (1972) (enacted). Senator Bayh
stated during the floor debate: "[Title IX] is to provide for the women of America something
that is rightfully theirs-- an equal chance to attend the schools of their choice, to develop the
skills they want, and to apply those skills with the knowledge that they will have a fair
chance to secure the jobs of their choice with equal pay for equal work." Id.
93. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d to 2000d-4 (West 1994).
94. Id. Title VI reads in relevant part: "No person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994). Title VII reads, in relevant part: "It shall

to discriminate against any individual
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ...
" 42 U.S.C.
...because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
§ 2000e-2(a)(l).

96. 118 CONG. REc. 5803 (1972).
97. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1991). The regulation sets forth in pertinent part:
"Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of sec. 703 of Title VII. [footnote omitted]
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct
of a sexual nature constitutes sexual harassment. . . ." Id.
98. See, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
99. See Meritor,477 U.S. at 65
100. See id.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA4W REVIEW

[Vol. 17

occurs as hostile environment harassment because the sexually offensive
conduct is between students, whereas teacher-to-student sexual harassment
can be characterized as either quid pro quo or hostile environment
harassment, depending on the situation. Some courts have regarded Title
VII hostile environment harassment standards for sex discrimination in the
employment context as applicable to Title IX. ° l
The Supreme Court then acknowledged, in the landmark case of Franklin
v. Gwinnet County Public Schools, 10 2 that students should be afforded the
same protection in school that an employee has in the workplace. Even
though the Court did not address whether a relationship existed between
Title VII standards for sexual harassment in the work place and Title IX, the
Supreme Court relied on the Title VII model to allow Franklin a Title IX
sexual harassment claim against her teacher.10 3 While citing Meritor
Saving Bank v. Vinson, 104 where the Supreme Court acknowledged hostile
environment discrimination as a violation of Title VII, the court explained:
Unquestionably, Title IX placed on Gwinnett County Public
Schools the duty not to discriminate on the basis of sex, and
'when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of
the subordinate's sex, that supervisor discriminates on the basis
of sex.' [footnote omitted] We believe the same rule should
apply when a teacher sexually harasses and abuses a stu05
dent.1
101. See, e.g., Alexander v. Yale Univ., 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980), affrg459 F. Supp.
I (D. Conn. 1977) (citing a Title VII case, Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
for the theorem that imposing academic achievement for sexual performance is sex
discrimination); Moire v. Temple Univ. Sch. of Medicine, 613 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Pa. 1985)
(showing that Title VII standards, as set forth by the EEOC, are also appropriate for Title
IX). But see, e.g., Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1989) (refusing
to decide whether Title VII sexually hostile environment claims were actionable under Title

DO.

102. 503 U.S. 60 (1992). Originally quoting from Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch.
Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1292 (N.D. Cal. 1993).

103. Id.

104. 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
105. Franklin,503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992). See also, Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 975

F.2d 137, 149 (5th Cir. 1992) ( reasoning that "there is no meaningful distinction between
the work environment and school environment which would forbid such discrimination in the

former context and tolerate it in the latter. Women need not endure sexual harassment by
state actors under any circumstances the school setting included.") (decided under equal
protection laws); Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1292 (N.D.
Cal. 1993) (agreeing with Doe v. Taylor and further quoting Ronna Greff Schneider, Sexual
HarassmentandHigherEducation,65 TEx. L. REV. 525, 551 (1987): "The importance and
function of environment is different in academia than in the workplace.... A sexually abusive
environment inhibits, if not prevents, the harassed student from developing her full
intellectual potential and receiving the most from the academic program.").
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The outcome of Frandin,however, left unanswered the question of whether
Title VII standards should be applicable to Title IX actions.
While the majority of lower courts continue to look to Title VII
definitions of hostile environment sexual harassment because of Franklin, 1°6 a few courts have declined where they interpret Title VI as the
10 7 Title VI prohibits racial
statute upon which Title DC was implemented.
discrimination in the educational setting and contains language notably
similar to Title IX. 10 8 Although this comment will only briefly discuss
that the majority of courts have applied Title VII as opposed to Title VI
standards to interpret Title IX, a more in-depth analysis of this complex
9
issue may be found in other commentaries.10 Until Title IX is amended
or the Office of Civil Rights implements regulations regarding
student-to-student sexual harassment, the courts are left to construct Title IX
by looking at the legislative history of Title DC, including predecessor titles,
such as Title VI and VII. Whether Title VI or Title VII is the applicable
statute is an important issue since it is the leading cause of the inconsistent
interpretations of Title IX by the courts in peer sexual harassment cases.
IV.

CONFLICrING INTERPRETATIONS OF TITLE IX PEER SEXUAL
HARASSMENT CLAIMS IN THE COURTS

The courts have witnessed an incredible rise in the number of peer sexual
110
More and more victimized
harassment claims filed under Title D.
relief through the courts,
finding
peers
students see other sexually harassed
which gives them hope in receiving the same remedy for the harassment

106. See Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1571 (N.D. Cal. 1993)
(finding that Title IX is similar to VI, yet holding that a claim for hostile sexual harassment
is actionable under Title IX); Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1022
(W.D. Mo. 1995); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Ed., 74 F.3d 1186, 1192-3, vacated, 91
F.3d 1418 (1 1th Cir. 1996); Seamonsv. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1231 n.5, 1233 (expressing no
opinion as to the district courts refusal to apply Title VII to Title IX, but considers the

elements for a hostile environment sexual harassmentclaim); Burrow v. Postville Community
Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1205 (N.D. Iowa 1996).

107. See Garza v. Galena Park Indep. Sch. Dist., 914 F. Supp. 1437, 1438 (S.D. Tex.
1994); Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1013 (5th Cir. 1996); Mennone

v. Gordon, 889 F. Supp. 53, 57 (D. Conn. 1995).
108. See id.
109. See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Gant, Comment, Applying Title VII "Hostile Work
Environment" Analysis to Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 - An Avenue of
Relieffor ictimsof Student-to-StudentSexualHarassmentin the Schools, 98 DICK. L. REV.
489 (1994); Jill Suzanne Miller, Title VI and Title VII: Happy Togetheras a Resolution to
Title IX PeerSexual HarassmentClaims, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 699 (1995).
110. See Henry, supra note 21.
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they have endured."' Unfortunately, across the country courts are split
in their guidelines for interpreting peer sexual harassment claims under Title
IX. 112 A student may very well need to hope that a judge will even
recognize their claim for peer sexual harassment under Title IX.
This segment will provide a detailed analysis about the currently few
decided peer sexual harassment cases and the discrepancies that remain
among the decisions in the federal courts. Subpart A will probe whether
courts have recognized a claim for peer sexual harassment under Title IX
or, alternatively, whether the court will apply Title VII workplace sexual
harassment standards to support an action for peer sexual harassment under
Title IX. Subpart B of this segment looks at the failure of the courts in
reconciling who may be liable among the school districts, school officials,
or teachers in students' claims. Subpart C examines the indecisiveness
among the courts as to the standard of liability, with a discussion of
alternative standards that the courts should consider. Subpart D explores
how severe a student's conduct must be for a court to find that the conduct
is not just flirting or teasing, but that the conduct arises to the level of
actionable peer sexual harassment which substantially alters the victim's
learning environment.
A. DO THE COURTS FIND THAT TITLE IX INCLUDES AN ACTION FOR PEER
SEXUAL HARASSMENT?

As previously mentioned, the Supreme Court has found that a teacher's
sexual harassment of a student violates Title IX." 3 Even though the
Court has not heard a peer sexual harassment case to date, the Court has at
least shown a response to the general problem of sexual harassment in the
schools. In North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 1 4 the Court stated
1 15
that Title IX should be accorded a sweep as broad as it's language.
This statement, combined with the Court's prohibition of teacher-student
harassment, indicates that the Supreme Court would also find that Title IX
forbids student-to-student sexual harassment.
The Northern District Court of California was the first lower court to
address the question of whether student-to-student sexual harassment is
actionable under Title IX. Only one year after the Franklin decision, the

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

See Henry, supra note 21.
See article cited supra note 22.
Franklin, 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992).
.456 U.S. 512 (1982).
Id. at 521.
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court in Doe v. Petaluma City School District1 16 found a violation of
Title IX upon a showing that the school district failed to end the sexual
harassment of a student by her peers. 117
In Petaluma, the
plaintiff-student was harassed when male students made continuous
comments about how she liked hot dogs in her pants and drew graffiti on
the bathroom stalls about the same subject. 118 Since this was the first
court to address a Title IX action for peer harassment, the court looked to
several teacher-to-student harassment cases to illustrate the development of
sexual harassment law in education. 119 The court also paid some deference to the Letter of Findings expressed by the Office of Civil Rights
(OCR), the agency responsible for implementing Title IX and its regulations. 120 The OCR believes that a school's failure to take an appropriate
response to peer
sexual harassment is a violation of Title IX, and the court
12
held the same. 1
Nevertheless, some federal courts have decided to interpret Franklin and
Title IX literally and have limited claims for peer sexual harassment under
Title IX. The Southern District Court of Texas in Garza v. Galena
Park122 succinctly decided that a student's peer sexual harassment claim
under Title IX was not supported by the Supreme Court's decision in
Franklin.12 3 The court briefly distinguished this case on the grounds that
the Franklindecision applies only to teacher-student harassment. 124 More
recently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School District125 held that the structure of Title IX supports a claim
only when the harassment is attributed to the conduct of the grant recipients. 126 The court in Rowinsky reasoned that the scope and structure of
Title IX, the legislative history, and agency interpretations of that law weigh
in favor of holding that Title IX can only impose liability on federally
funded educational institutions.1 27 This interpretation allowed only a little
room for a student to prove a peer sexual harassment claim through Title
DC. If the student could prove that the school district responded to peer
116. 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993), rev d, 54 F.3d 1447 (9th Cir. 1995)
(reversing the issue of qualified immunity for a school counselor).

117. Petaluma, 830 F. Supp. at 1572.
118. Id. at 1563-1566.

119. Id. at 1572.
120. Id. at 1573.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
914 F. Supp. 1437 (S.D. Tex. 1994).
Id. at 1438.
Id.
80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996).

126. Id. at 1013.
127. Id. at 1012.
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sexual harassment claims differently on the basis of128sex, then the federally
IX.
funded school district would be violating Title
Garza is one example of a case where the court has completely refused
129
The court in
to recognize a claim for peer sexual harassment.
Rowinsky also seems to retreat from extending Title IX to support such a
claim, but the court held that a peer sexual harassment claim may be viable
if the school district responded to sexual harassment claims differently based
on sex. 130 Progressively, like Doe v. Petaluma, another court has recognized that Title IX prohibits sexual harassment in the educational setting,

1 3 1 Either type of
whether it be teacher-to-student or student-to-student.
conduct is sexual harassment, and sexual harassment in general prohibits any
1 32 With the Supreme
student from obtaining their right to an education.
Court's response to the problem of teacher-to-student harassment in Franklin
and their mandate to broadly interpret the language in Title IX, coupled with
at least two lower courts recognizing that peer sexual harassment is a type
of harassment prohibited by Title IX, victims of peer sexual harassment
should reasonably believe that the courts will continue to find a remedy
through a broad interpretation of Title IX.
Extending the language of Title IX itself is one way that courts will
support a claim for peer sexual harassment. In the alternative, courts make
peer sexual harassment claims actionable by applying Title VII standards for
workplace sexual harassment to Title IX claims. Basically, where a court
refuses to rewrite the text of Title IX to include a prohibition of peer sexual
harassment, a court may direct the application of Title IX to achieve the
same goal. One way for the court to accomplish this is by looking at the
legislative history of Title IX and the language of predecessor titles, such as
Title VI and VII.

128. Id. at 1016. (explaining that a school district might violate Title IX if it treated
sexual harassment of boys more seriously than sexual harassment of girls).
129. See also Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 862 F. Supp. 363 (M.D. Ga.

1994), claim reinstated,74 F.3d 1186 (1Ith Cir.), vacated 91 F.3d 1418 (1996), original
claim dismissed, 1997 WL 475207 (1997). The latest court opinion from Davis dismissed
the original claim in its entirety for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Id. The court reasoned that a school district may not be held liable under Title IX where
"Congress gave no clear notice to schools and teachers that they, rather than society as a
whole, would accept responsibility for remedying student-to-student sexual harassmentwhen
they chose to accept federal financial assistance under Title IX." Id. at 13.
130. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
131. See Oona R.-S., by Kate S. v. Santa Rosa City Sch., 890 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Cal.
1995). (holding that the right created by Title IX may be violated when students are
subjected to sexual harassment by their peers).
132. See Stein, supra note 14 at 90.
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As mentioned before, the courts are undecided as to whether Title VI or
133
Title VII is the appropriate statute for which to interpret Title IX.
Title VI prohibits racial discrimination in the educational setting and uses
134 Title VII, on the other hand,
notably similar language as Title IX.
prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace, and the regulations of Title
VII prohibit both quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment. 135 While both Title VI and VII were considered in implementing
Title X, the courts tend to choose only one of the titles as applicable to
Title IX.
Recall the unanswered question left in Franklin: whether Title VII sexual
harassment standards in the workplace should be applied to Title IX. Since
Franklin, the majority of courts have answered this question in the
affirmative. 136 These courts have found the Supreme Court's recognition,
that a student should have the same protection in school that an employee
has in the workplace, supports the conclusion that Title VII provides
for enforcing the provisions of Title IX in peer sexual harassment
standards
137
suits.
13 8
The court in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education further
argued that Title VII standards provide only minimum protection where
damage caused by sexual harassment is arguably greater in the classroom
than in the workplace. 139 Harassment in the classroom generally has a
greater and longer lasting impact on young victims, and a sexually abusive
environment inhibits a student from developing her full intellectual
potential. 140 An adult may leave their work setting, whereas it is virtual14 1 Not only
ly impossible for a child to just leave their assigned school.
have the majority of courts applied Title VII standards to make a Title IX
peer sexual harassment claim actionable, but the Davis court further argued
that Title IX should have standards even more rigid than Title VII.

133. See cases cited supra notes 106 and 107 and accompanying text.
134. See related commentary text for supra note 107 and 108.
135. See supra note 98.
136. See Petaluma, 830 F. Supp. at 1575; Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F.
Supp. 1006, 1021 (W.D. Mo. 1995); Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186,
1191-1192 (11th Cir.), vacated, 91 F.3d 1418 (11th Cir. 1996); Burrow v. Postville
Community Sch. Dist., 929F. Supp. 1193, 1205 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
137. See cases cited supra note 136.
138. 862 F. Supp. 363 (M.D. Ga. 1994), claim reinstated,74 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir.)
(commentary text refers to this court opinion which supported a Title IX cause of action),
vacated,91 F.3d 1418 (1996), originalclaimdismissed,1997 WL 475207 (1997). Also, see

supra note 129 and accompanying text.
139. Davis, 74 F.3d at 1193.

140. Id.
141. Id.
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WHO CAN BE LIABLE FOR PEER SEXUAL HARASSMENT UNDER TITLE IX?

While a student-victim can be assured that a court will probably allow a
claim for peer sexual harassment under Title IX, the student will have
difficulty in predicting whether the court will allow him or her to sue both
the school district and the school officials. A peer sexual harassment suit
is virtually worthless unless the student is afforded an end to the harassment
or remedy for the harm suffered. Remedies for the harm suffered are the
most common award where the victim-student has either withdrawn himself
or herself from the school or graduated by the time the suit is settled. The
issue of who may be liable will also determine the amount awarded to the
student. In most situations, neither school districts nor school officials alone
have a substantial amount of money to compensate a plaintiff. So a victim
student will receive better compensation for the harm he or she endured if
a court will acknowledge that both school districts and individual school
officials may be liable.
At a very minimum, the consensus among the courts indicates that they
are willing to allow a claim against the school district. 142 The language
of Title IX explicitly prohibits sexual discrimination by federally funded
educational activities. School districts are the institutions which receive
federal grants, so a literal interpretation of Title IX supports the conclusion
that school districts may be held liable. Moreover, Congress could not have
intended for federal monies to be expended on educational institutions which
are found to have engaged in the conduct proscribed by Title IX. 143
Such reasoning prompted the Supreme Court to hold in Franklin that
monetary damages are available as a remedy in a Title IX enforcement
action brought by a private plaintiff against a school district. 144 Therefore, the courts are willing to allow a student-victim of peer sexual
harassment to sue the federal grant recipient, which in most cases is the
school district.
The waters become murky, however, when the lower courts consider
whether individuals, such as principals and teachers, may be held liable in
their official or individual capacities. When the majority of lower courts
reject the Title IX claim against individuals, they do so for two reasons. 145 First, the courts will not interpret Title IX to permit individual
liability where clear direction from Congress is lacking. 146 Second, the
Supreme Court's opinion in Franklin concerned only the case against the
142. See, e.g., Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1008.
143. Oona, 890 F. Supp at 1465. (quoting Franklin,503 U.S. at 75).

144. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75.
145. See, e.g., Petaluma, 830 F. Supp. at 1577; Seamons, 864 F. Supp. at 1116.
146. See, e.g., Petaluma, 830 F. Supp. at 1577.
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school district and did not indicate whether such an action could be brought
against individuals. 147 But when a few courts at least consider the
148
their reasoning may
possibility of individual liability under Title JX,
be important for future resolution of this issue.
14 9
In Burrows v. Postville Community School District, the court
concluded that a Title IX claim may be asserted against school0 officials in
15
The court
their official capacity, but not in their individual capacity.
is
capacity
official
their
in
reasoned that a claim against the school officials
15 1 The victim-student
essentially a claim against the school district itself.
in this case sought to hold liable not only the school district but also the
superintendent and the principal for failing to take any meaningful action to
152 Here, the court's reasons for prohibitend the peer sexual harassment.
ing individual liability are basically the same two reasons as given by the
majority courts which were stated previously. Though the student was
inhibited from obtaining money out of the school official's pockets, the
student was able to bring the principal and superintendent in their official
capacities as defendants to the lawsuit. Ultimately, being a party to the suit
in their official capacities must of had the effect of punishing these
individuals and hopefully will deter others from such conduct.
lS3
Mennone v. Gordon
In a somewhat different approach, the court in
also found that school officials could be held liable in their official
154 More strikingly,
capacities in addition to the school district itself.
though, the court additionally found that the plain language of Title IX does
not preclude the liability of defendants in their individual capacity so long
15 5 In Mennone the court
as they exercised a sufficient level of control.

147. See Petaluma, 830 F. Supp. at 1575. The court reminded that:
The procedural posture of Franklin must be born in mind... . The alleged
sexual harasser in Franklin,Andrew Hill [a coach-teacher], was never a party to
the lawsuit. Moreover, the only individual defendant in the case, William Prescott
[another teacher], had been dismissed by the district court ... . Id.
148. See, e.g., Petaluma, 54 F.3d at 1452. (granting qualified immunity to the
individual, but finding that if the individual engaged in the same conduct today, where the
individual's conduct occured two years prior to the Franklin decision, the court might

consider him individually liable); Burrows, 929 F. Supp. at 1207 (granting liability against
the individuals only in their official capacities).
149. 929 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Iowa 1996).
150. Id. at 1207.
151. Id. at 1207.

152. Id. at 1196.
153. 889 F. Supp. 53 (D. Conn. 1995).
154. Id. at 55. (holding that to maintain an action against the superintendent in his
official capacity, the plaintiff must allege that offical was directly and personally responsible
for the inaction or action on the part of the school board or teacher).
155. Id. at 56.
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looked at the plain language of Title IX, which broadly refers to discrimination occurring under any education program or activity. 116 The court
then reasoned that the language does not restrict the potential class of
defendants based on their identity but does restrict them based on their
function or role in a program or activity.157 Moreover, Title IX regulations include in the definition for "recipient" of federal funds those persons
or entities that do not receive funding directly from the federal government,
but who also operate a program or activity. 15 8 Accordingly, the court in
Mennone held that the student-victim could bring159a claim under Title IX
against the teachers in their individual capacities.
These two cases demonstrate a court's willingness to stretch Title IX to
include liability for school officials who did not appropriately respond to the
peer sexual harassment. In the future such an approach could effectively
stop ongoing peer sexual harassment in the schools. First, official liability
for principals and superintendents will promote speedy action on their part
to confront and dal with reported cases of peer sexual harassment. Second,
individual liability will induce teachers to recognize and prohibit sexual
harassment in their classrooms and in the hallways. In the end, if a teacher
or school official fails to acknowledge such cases, then victim-students
should be able to bring a claim not only against the school district but also
against the individuals in either their official or individual capacities so that
the victim-students will receive fair compensation for the harassment they
have endured. Where the waters still remain unpredictable for this issue,
victims of peer sexual harassment may see the tide turning in favor of
allowing individual liability under Title IX.
C. WHAT IS THE STANDARD OF LIABILITY?

Thus far, the majority of courts are willing to allow a Title IX claim for
peer sexual harassment against the school district and possibly individuals.
The next issue, which remains undecided by the courts, pertains to the
standard of liability for school districts. A definite standard of liability
needs to be agreed upon by the courts. Otherwise, school districts do not
know what degree of responsibility they have towards reported cases of peer

156. Id.

157.
158.
159.
qualified
student's

Id.
Id. (citing to 34 C.F.R. § 106.1).
Id. It should be noted, however, that the teacher was subsequently granted
immunity where the teacher's conduct was not determined to have violated the
right under Title IX.
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sexual harassment. 160 The discrepancies among the courts regarding this
issue are based on the fact that Title IX does not set forth a standard nor do
the regulations. Courts therefore rely upon standards from similar statutes,
yet differ on whether the standard should be construed from Title VI or VII.
Even if the courts choose which title the standard should come from, there
remains a split 16 1 among the courts that have addressed the issue as to
what proof is necessary to state a claim against a school district for its
failure to respond to and remedy peer sexual harassment. The following
162
two court decisions will provide an illustration of this split.

163
The Fifth Circuit in Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School District
concluded that Title IX was enacted pursuant to Title VI, and found that
the educational
Title IX requires proof of intentional conduct on the part of
164 In Rowinsky,
imposed.
be
could
institution before monetary liability
the victim-students were continually sexually harassed by their peers at
165
The Fifth Circuit
grade school and while riding the school bus.
deduced that Title IX was modeled after Title VI where precedent166and the
The
use of identical language in both strongly suggest a similarity.
standards of Title VI require the plaintiff to show intent to discriminate.
By way of the court's example, the student-victims in Rowinsky could have
shown intentional discrimination if they proved that the school district
treated sexual harassment of boys more seriously than sexual harassment of
girls or even that it turned a blind eye toward sexual harassment of girls
167 Consequently, the appelwhile addressing assaults that harmed boys.
late court in Rowinsky held that the student-victim did not prove intent to
discriminate on the part of the school district where it was not shown that
the school district responded to the sexual harassment claims differently
168
based on sex.

160. An example of when a school takes too much caution in their responsibility for
disciplining cases of sexually harassing conduct is when a teacher reported a 1st-grader for
kissing another on the cheek which resulted in the school suspending the child from class.
See School Suspends ist-GraderforKissing, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Sept. 25, 1996 at 4.
161. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
162. For a complete comparison of all the cases that have addressed what standard of
liability is applicable to peer sexual harrassment claims under Title IX, see Doe v. Petaluma
City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
163. 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996).
164. Id. at 1016.
165. Id. at 1008-09. Details of the alleged harassment can be found in the second
paragraph of the introduction section to this comment.
166. Id. at 1012-1013, n. 14.
167. Id. at 1016.
168. Id.
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Two months after the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Rowinsky, the Northern
District Court of Iowa issued an opinion in Burrowswhich disagreed in part
with the analysis of Title IX in Rowinsky. The district court in Burrows
agreed instead with a previous Eleventh Circuit decision that found Title IX
was enacted pursuant to Title VI.169 Moreover, the court reasoned that
a student-victim can prove the required intent to discriminate standard of
liability on the part of the school district from the totality of evidence,
including evidence of the school's knowing failure to respond to peer sexual
170
harassment of a student.
In Burrows, the plaintiff was sexually harassed on a daily basis by her
fellow students for over three years. 171 The alleged conduct included
students frequently calling the plaintiff "slut," "whore," "bitch," "skank,"
and "f----in' tramp"; students repeatedly throwing food and spit wads at her;
students who pushed, elbowed and intentionally ran into her; a male student
kicked her between the legs many times in a sexually offensive manner, and
students wrote sexual obscenities and threats on her books, her folder, her
locker, and school bathroom walls. 172 Although the school had actual
knowledge of the sexual harassment, the school failed to prevent or stop the
sexually harassing behavior by students over whom the school exercised
some degree of control. 173 In the end, the court in Burrows held that
there was enough evidence from which a trier of fact could reasonably infer
that the school district intentionally discriminated against her when it
knowingly failed to respond to the peer sexual harassment.1 74
The Rowinsky and Burrows cases demonstrate the two types of standards
of liability that have been generally followed by courts which have
addressed claims for peer sexual harassment. 175 On one side, the court
in Rowinsky adopted what one commentator dubbed as an "equal
169. Burrows, 929 F. Supp. at 1200 (agreeing with Davis, 74 F.3d at 1194).

170. Burrows, 929 F. Supp. at 1205.
171. Id. at 1197.
172. Id. at 1197.
173. Id. at 1205.
174. Id. The totality of evidence the court considered included the following:
evidence that the school district knowingly failed to respond appropriately to peer
sexual harassment of Lisa despite numerous report by her, her Parents, her attorney,
various teachers and the OCR; evidence that the school district knowingly failed
to implement appropriate sexual harassmentpolicies and grievance procedures;...
evidence that the school district failed to inquire into Lisa's increasing tardiness and
absences from school; and evidence that the school district chose to remove Lisa
from the hostile sexual environment and granted her request to graduate early,
rather than attempting to eliminate the hostile environment. Id.
175. See Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Scho. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006 (W.D. Mo. 1995); Oona
R.S. v Santa Rosa City Schs., 890 F. Supp. 1452, 1466 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Doe v. Petaluma
City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1575 (N.D. Cal 1993).
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176 A Title
protection-like test" for the intentional discrimination standard.
VII "employment-like standard,, 177 on the other hand, is essentially what
the Burrows court followed for its "knowingly failed" standard.
Both, however, have been criticized for creating standards that rest on
extreme ends of a spectrum. If a court uses the equal-protection like test,
then fewer student-victims would prevail in cases claiming severe peer
sexual harassment. 178 The student would have to prove that school
officials intended for one gender to harass the other gender and deliberately
encouraged this result by their failure to enforce rules against harassment. 179 But if a court uses the "knowingly failed" employment-like
standard, then schools would be liable when they were unsuccessful in
stopping the peer sexual harassment. Such a standard may not be appropriate for schools where students are arguably more difficult to control than
employees. 180 Either way, one standard is too difficult to prove for
student-victims while the other standard may be too easily imposed upon
schools for student-to-student sexual harassment claims.
Alternatively, the opinions from two cases may suggest a happy medium
between the equal protection-like test and the knowingly failed standards.
In Oona v. SantaRosa, the court found that discriminatory intent on the part
of the school was a necessary element for a Title IX peer sexual harassment
claim but further stated that "[s]uch discrimination may manifest itself in the
active encouragement of peer harassment, the toleration of the harassing
behavior of male students, or the failure to take adequate steps to deter or
punish peer harassment." 181 Likewise, the court in Petaluma held that it
must be proven that the school district intended to discriminate but added
that the school's failure to take appropriate action might be evidence of such
intent to discriminate. 182 Although neither opinion explicitly states as
such, it is apparent that in both opinions the courts preferred a standard of
liability for intentional discrimination that resembles the deliberate
some courts. 183
indifference test as applied to Section 1983 claims in

176. See Thomas R. Baker, Comment, Sexual MisconductAmong Students; Title IX

Court Decisions in the Aftermath of Franklin v. Gwinnett County, 109 ED. LAW REP. 519

(1996).

177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See Kirsten M. Erikkson, Note, What Our Childrenare ReallyLearningin School:
Using Title IX to Combat Peer Sexual Harassment,83 GEO. L.J. 1799, 1816 (1995).

180. See Baker, supra note 176.

181. Oona v. Santa Rosa, 890 F. Supp. at 1469.
182. See Petaluma, 830 F. Supp. at 1576.

183. See Baker, supra note 173 where the original interpretation of the "deliberate
indifference" test appears.
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Taken by way of example from two Section 1983 cases, the deliberate
indifference standard of liability may be shown where the school's repeated
negligence towards peer sexual harassment is considered to rise to the level
of deliberate indifference. 184 The deliberate indifference standard may
also be established where the school officials act with such deliberate
indifference to known or reasonably discoverable harm occurring to students
as to project a custom of encouraging abuse of the student.18 Under the
deliberate indifference standard of liability, the student-victim would just
need to show that the school disregarded the ongoing peer sexual harassment, which is not as difficult to prove as the equal protection-like test.
Additionally, a school would be liable under this standard only when school
officials ignore the harm occurring to students and not when they failed in
their efforts to stop the harassment. This deliberate indifference standard of
liability may emerge from the case law as a186reasonable middle ground
between the Rowinsky and Burrows standards.
D.

HOW SEVERE DOES THE PEER SEXUAL HARASSMENT HAVE TO BE?

If schools. are to be held liable for remedying peer sexual harassment,
then to what extent is a school responsible for recognizing the hostile
environment created by the harassment? Surely a school would not be liable
for controlling childish behavior or simple offensive utterances, comments,
or vulgarities. 187 Even the public was outraged when a first grader in
North Carolina was suspended from his classroom
after a teacher caught him
188
kissing another first-grader on the cheek.
Thus far, the peer sexual harassment described in the previously
mentioned cases contain sexually offensive acts which persist for years and
sometimes force the student-victim to leave the school. Such situations
should not be an example of the necessary level of severity where the peer
sexual harassment rose to the level of compelling the student to withdraw
from school. On the other hand, one-time occurrences, such as kissing a
first-grader on the cheek, should not be compared to the level of severe peer
sexual harassment which impairs the student's learning environment. To
avoid such absurd interpretations, the courts need to hammer out when peer

184. See Pagano v. Massapequa Pub. Sch., 714 F. Supp. 641, 643 (E.D. N.Y. 1989).
185. See Elliott v. New Miami Bd. of Educ., 799 F. Supp. 818, 823(S.D. Ohio 1992).
186. See Baker, supranote 176 where a different version of this theorem originally
appears.

187. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Ed., 74 F.3d 1186, 1194 (1 th Cir.), vacated,

91 F.3d 1418 (11th Cir. 1996).
188. See School Suspends ist-GraderforKissing, CHICAGO TRIBuNE, Sept. 25, 1996
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sexual harassment will be considered so severe as to create a hostile
environment in the educational setting.
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals set forth a standard to aid in
determining when the harassment is severe enough to require a remedy.
The court held that Title IX is violated when the educational setting is
permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is
sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of the student's
189 The
environment and which creates an abusive educational setting.
court further added that in determining whether a student-victim has proven
a hostile environment, a court must be concerned with "(1) the frequency
of the abusive conduct; (2) the conduct's severity; (3) whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating rather than merely offensive; and9' (4)
19 0
plaintiff's performance.
whether it unreasonably interferes with the
191 Ifthe
These factors must be viewed both objectively and subjectively.
trier of fact finds that the conduct is not severe because a reasonable person
would not find it abusive, then the harassment is without a Title IX
remedy. 192 Likewise, if the student-victim does not subjectively perceive
the environment to be abusive, then the conduct does not violate Title
ix.193

Accordingly, the severity of the harassment is judged by both the fact
of
finder and the student-victim. This standard acknowledges that victims
194
different ways.
in
conduct
of
types
certain
to
react
may
varying ages
A first-grader may feel that a kiss on the cheek is harmless whereas a
teacher who was a witness to the scene might consider the kiss to be
harassing behavior from an adult point of view. So if a teacher now saw
a 1st-grader kiss another on the cheek on the playground, the level of
hostility from this conduct would be judged by both the adult and child's
perspective. Hopefully, the adoption of a standard like the Eleventh
Circuit's will filter out conduct which is simply childplay, childish
vulgarities, or just adolescent flirting.

189.
190.
191.
192.

SeeDavis, 74 F.3d at 1194.
Id.
Id.
Id.

193. Id.

194. See Alexandra A. Bodnar, Comment, ArmingStudentsforBattle: Amending Title

IX to Combat the Sexual Harassmentof Students by Students in Primary and Secondary
School, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN's STUD. 549, 583 (1996).
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CONCLUSION

The statements and statistics presented here add up to an
undeniable mandate: [the courts,] parents, teachers, and
administrators must acknowledge that sexual harassment in
school is creating a hostile environment that compromises the

education of America's children. .

.

. For when children's

self-esteem and development are hampered, the repercussions
echo throughout our society. 195
One goal our society should strive to achieve is the elimination of sexual
harassment among our children. Children should not expect to grow up in
a sexually abusive environment when we do not tolerate such conduct at the
adult level. The law has already made great advancements towards
remedying the problem of sexual harassment in the work setting. To clear
the employment context of sexually abusive behavior, the law must
complete the task of eliminating student-to-student sexual harassment.
Sexual harassment will never stop if we do not teach our children at an
early age that certain behavior is inappropriate before they enter the adult
stage of their life.
Combating the problem will demand various methods. So far, California
and Minnesota have recently enacted legislation which requires educational
institutions to develop and maintain a written policy on sexual harassment. 196 One commentator has proposed guidelines on sex-based harassment of students that should be adopted by the Office of Civil Rights to
effectively enforce Title lX. 197 Another commentator has recommended
that Title IX itself should be amended to specifically include a prohibition
of student-to-student sexual harassment.19 Even more specifically, one
commentator has set forth what schools should include in their sexual
harassment policies and procedures and further describes how schools can
199
protect students from ongoing peer sexual harassment.
In helping the efforts to eliminate peer sexual harassment, the goal of this
article is to illustrate the need for courts to develop a uniform approach in
remedying severe harassment in the schools. Since Title IX and Section
195. AMERICAN AWS'N OF UNIV. WOMEN FoUND., HOsTILE HALLWAYs: THE AAUW
SURVEY ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS, June 1993 at 21.
196. See Cal. Educ. Code § 212.6 (West 1994); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 127.46 (West 1994).
197. See Carrie N. Baker, Comment, Proposed Title IX Guidelines on Sex-Based
Harassmentof Students, 43 EMORY L.J. 271 (1994).
198. See Bodnar, supra note 194.
199. See JoAnn Strauss, Comment, PeerSexual Harassmentof High School Students:
A ReasonableStudent Standard and AffirmativeDuty Imposed on EducationalInstitutions,
10 LAW & INEQ. 163 (1992).
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1983 are currently the only federal statutes by which a student may bring
a claim, the courts need to be consistent in their interpretations of these
statutes. First, the courts should maintain Section 1983 as an avenue of
relief by which a student may sue the school officials instead of just the
school district or as a way to force the schools to recognize same gender
sexual harassment. Secondly, the courts cannot continue to fluctuate in
their development of applying Title IX to peer sexual harassment claims.
This comment encourages the courts to expand the liability of school
districts and include school officials. Additionally, a uniform standard of
liability should be adopted, and this comment recommends the deliberate
indifference test as an appropriate standard for solving the split among the
courts. Lastly, the courts should follow the Eleventh Circuit's proposed
standard for determining when sexual harassment is so severe as to require
a remedy by the courts.
Promoting the awareness and recognition of the need to stop peer sexual
harassment in the schools will have to develop over time. Meanwhile, the
courts have the function of supplying a remedy to student-victims who are
immediately faced with ongoing sexual harassment and who are disregarded
by their peers, their teachers, and other school officials in their cries for
help. In the future, the courts will assist in maintaining the integrity of peer
sexual harassment policies in educational institutions when schools start to
falter in their concern to eliminating this intolerable behavior. A consistent
approach by the courts in student-to-student sexual harassment suits is an
additional measure to insure that our children will enjoy a non-discriminatory environment while pursuing their education.
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